THE AMERICAN
LAW REGISTER AND REVIEW
PUBLISHED MONTHLY BY MEMBERS OF THE DEPARTmENT OF LAw
THE U NIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA.

or

.- dr'isoo" Committee:
HAMPTON L. CARSON. Chairman.
GEORGE TUCKER BISPHAM,
ERSKINE HAZARD DICKSON.
GEORGE STUART PATTERSON,
WILLIAM STRUTHERS ELLIS.
GEORGE WHARTON PEPPER.
WILLIAI DRAPER LEWIS.
Editoxv:
THOMAS JA.IES

IEAGHER. Editor-in-Chief.

ARTHUR G. DICKSON-.
WALTER C. DOUGLAS. JR..
CYRUS D. FOSS. JR.,
THOMTAS S GATES,
BENJAMIN

GEORGE HENDERSON.
HORACE L. HENDERSON.
DILWORTH P. HIBBERD,
WILLIA-M B. LINN,
F. PERKIN-S.

SUBSCRIPTION PRICE, $5.oo PER ANNUM.

,

SINGLE COPIES, 50 CENTS.

Address all literary communications to the EDITOR-IN-CHIEF, Department of Law.
University of Pennsylvania, Sixth and Chestnut Streets, Philadelphia, Pa.; all business communications to W. S. ELLIS. Esq., 736 Drexel Building, Philadelphia, Pa.

THE MIAGAZINE.
Through the courtesy of Hon. Charles C.
Bonney, President of the World's Congress Auxiliary of the
World's Columbian Exposition, THE AMERICAN LAw REGISTER
AND REVIEW has been accorded the privilege of printing for the
first time a number of the articles and papers read before the
Congress on Jurisprudence and Law Reform. Possibly no feature
of the great fair was more welcomed by the scientific and educational world than the various congresses which were assembled
through the efforts of the Auxiliary Committee, and of these none
was more beneficial in its tendencies than that to which we have
referred. The work of Hon. Charles C. Bonney as the head of
the general department is, doubtless, familiar to all who followed
the work of the Committee, and was characterized by a spirit of
earnestness and ability which to which the success achieved is
chiefly due.
It is our purpose to publish a number of these articles, since the
importance of the subjects and the ability of the writers fully warrant the belief that they will be of great interest, presenting, as they
do, theoretical discussion, sometimes comparative, always analytical,
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of topics which cannot but be of vital importance in the general
jurisprudence.
development of the system of
In our present issue we have presented the first of these papersviz. : "Limitation qf the Antount One Ji/ar Take Ib' Descent 7r by
i/," by Hon. Harvey B. Hurd, of Chicago, and "Unfo-nzity in
ifa-iage and Divorce Zaws," by Prof. Edmund H. Bennett, of
Boston. And in our succeeding issue we hope to begin the publication of a series of comparative papers upon the administration
of civil and criminal justice in the different countries of the
world.
DE FACTO OFFICERS.

The case of State v. Gardner, decided in

January by the Supreme Court of Ohio, (42 N. E. Rep. 999,) discusses the question whether there can be such a thing as a tie facto
office. The facts were that defendant was indicted in the Common
Pleas for offerng a bribe to one Hugill, Commissioner of the City
of Akron; and he demurred to the indictment on the ground that
the Act of April 20, 1893, creating the municipal government of
Akron, in virtue of which Hugill was exercising his duties, was
unconstitutional and void. The demurrer was sustained. Exceptions being taken the case was brought to the Supreme Court for
review, and the judgment was reversed, (Shauck, J., dissenting).
The decision was based on the doctrine that the official acts of
public officers cannot be collaterally attacked by calling in question
the constitutionality of the act creating them. This decision, so
stated, is perfectly in accord with sound rules of law. Granting
that this is a collateral attack, we must admit that the act of the
officer must be upheld.
This view is established by a consideration of what constitutesa defacto officer. Lord Raymond in Parker v. Ziir, I Ld. Raym.
658 (1703), says he is "one who has the reputation of being the
officer he assumes to be, and yet is not a good officer in point of
law."
In a case in 1876 in Massachusetts (Petersilea v. Stone, 1i9
'Mass. 465), it was said that ''third persons from the nature of the
case, cannot always investigate the right of one assuming to hold an
important office, even so far as to see that he has colour of title to it,.
by virtue of some appointment or election." On the other hand, it
is stated by Field, J., inNiroton v. Shelbr Co., I18 U. S. 425 (ISS 5 ),
that "no cases sanction the doctrine that there can be a Iefat to
office under a constitutional government, and that the acts of the
incumbent are entitled to consideration as valid acts of a ie fato
office."
Here, however, the attempt was to a create a special
tribunal, there being already one properly constituted in existence
and therefore the term de facto could not be applied to that
which was void ab initio. A similar state of facts existed in Hil,h-eth v. .fe tire, I J. J. Marsh, 206 (1829).
There the court
expressly distinguished the case from that of a revolutionary government in which "there is no government in action except the government tie facto, because all the attributes of sovereignty have by
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usurpation been transferred from those who had been legally invested
with them to others who, sustained by a power above the form of
law, claim to act and do act in their stead."
This practically
covers the present case, for their being no government except
the unconstitutional one, and that government having been
acquiesced in for two years, or as Lord Raymond says, "having
acquired a reputation for being correct," is a government tie facto
and cannot be collaterally attacked.
There is another view to take of this case which leads us to
question very strongly the decision though not the principles laid
down. The definition given by Van Fleet, § 3, of a collateral
attack on a judicial proceeding, is that it is " an attempt to avoid,
defeat or evade it, or to deny its force and effect in some manner
not provided by law."
The crime under which Gardner was
indicted is defined by statute to be "corruptly giving, promising
or offering to an officer anything of value, etc."
The averment in
the indictment states that the person bribed was an officer and
therefore puts that question directly in issue. It is a material part
for if there were no officer there could be no such crime as the one
charged. It cannot come within the definition of collateral attack
given above, because it is clearly provided by law that a person can
attack any material part of an indictment. Therefore it is submitted that the unconstitutionality of the statue being directly in
issue, defendant had a right to avail himself of that defense.
CHASTITY OF WITNESSES.
In a recent decision, the Supreme
Court of MAissouri has placed itself on record as once more
espousing a doctrine in the law of evidence that it had formerly
maintained, but had in later years repudiated. By its last action
it deliberately assumes an unenviable and unique position, which
finds no precedent in any jurisdiction, and which is as untenable
on principle as it is unjust in its practical results. The case is that
of State v. Siblel', 33 S. W. Rep. 167, and in it the majority of
the court express it as their opinion, that while general reputation
for unchastity is a ground for impeaching the veracity of a female
witness, there is no basis for the application of the same rule in the
case of a male witness. The opinion is not very fully considered,
and its weight as an authority is weakened by the fact that three of
the judges dissented from the views expressed by the majority of
the court.
This strange anomaly in the Missouri law had for its origin a
dictum in a former case: State v. Grant, '79 M1o. 133 (1883),
where the court, after deciding that general moral character, as well
as reputation for veracity, may be inquired into to impeach a witness, adds, "and this ruling has been made in cases as to general
reputation of a female witness respecting chastity."
It is a very debatable question whether the ground for impeaching a witness upon reputation should be extended beyond that of
reputation for veracity, and the prevailing rule deduced from the
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cases is that general moral character does not afford a safe criterion
But if it be that the
for testing the truthfulness of a witness.
inquiry should extend to moral character, it is difficult to see upon
what reasoning it is possible to differentiate chastity from moral
character, and to arrive at the conclusion that it forms an ingredient
of the character of a-female witness, but has no essential connection
when the moral status of a witness of the opposite sex is in question. Such a view may find some support in the different treatment accorded the sexes by the practice of modern society, but
that is rather a cause for adverse reflection upon the moral standard
adopted by society than for arguing its adoption in a court of law,
whose proceedings are supposed to be dominated by reason, and
not by arbitrary custom. There can be no justification for the
introduction of evidence of unchastity to impeach the veracity of a
witness of either sex, except it be upon the broad ground of general moral character, and when it is placed upon that ground, every
reason that can be urged for its admission in one case is equally
applicable to its admission in the other. This is the plain sense of
the question, and it should not be allowed to be perverted by
sophistry born of an unjust social regime. Either the test of general moral character should be abandoned, or else it should be
carried out in an equitable and consistent manner.
LIMITATION OF COMMON CARRIER'S LIABILITY.
A recent case,
Ballimor-e & 0. S. W R. R. Co. v. Ragsdlale, 42 N. E. Rep.
iio6, (App. Ct. of Ind., Feb. i9, 1896) contains a dictum to
the effect that a common carrier cannot by contract limit the
amount of a shipper's recovery, although he may agree with the
latter upon a valuation of the property carried, which shall be conclusive in case of loss. As this question is far from being settled,
some discussion of the principles involved might not be untimely.
The Common Law rule, holding the carrier to be an insurer
against every injury to the goods shipped, except those caused by
the act of God or the public enemy, was a necessary one, considering the state of the times and the small amount of business transacted. It is clear that it would have been both easy and profitable
for a carrier to enter into collusion with robbers, or even with his
own servants, and so share the profits of the scheme to defraud the
shipper; for the latter was completely at the carrier's mercy, being
unable to prove how the loss had occurred.
But at the present time these reasons for a strict rule have practicallv vanished. The question arises, then, to what extent should
the law upon the subject be relaxed? The leading case is Hari v.
Pa. R. R. CO., 112 U. S. 332 (1884), in which the court held
that the shipper was bound by the terms of the contract of affreightment, and was limited in his recovery to the amount therein stated.
The clause in the contract referring to the carrier's liability was
as follows: "On condition that the carrier assumes a liability on
the stock to the extent of the folllowing agreed valuation, . . .
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not exceeding," etc. The court (per Blatchford, J.,) cited with
approval: Newvbztuer v. Howard & Co.'s Eapxress, 6 Phila. 174
(1866); Squire v. N Y. Central R. R. Co., 98 Mass. 239
(1867) ; Hopkins v. Westcoft, 6 Blatchford 64 (1868) ; BeIger v.
.Dinsmore, 51 N. Y. 166 (1872) ; Oppenheimer v. EAress Co.,
69 M11.62 (1873) ; Jfag7&ni v. Dinswre, 70 N. Y. 410 (I877)
Elkins v. Daznsporta/ion Co., 8i Pa. 315 (1876); R. R. Co. v.
Henlein, 52 Ala. 6o6 (875); H-arve, v. R. R., 74 Mo. 538
and a few
(3881) ; Graves v. R. R., 137 Mass. 33 (884),
others.
In all these cases the language of the contracts was similar to
that in Yarl v. .R. R. Co., and the meaning exactly the same. Close
attention to the words used reveals that there is in every one of the
contracts, a limit set to the shipper's recovery in case the goods
carried be injured or lost; for it could hardly be said that, if the
goods were actually worth less than that limit, the shipper would
be able to recover more than their real value. The language used,
that the "carrier assumes a liability to the exte'n'" of the valuation,
clearly indicates that a maximum limit is meant, not a liquidation
of damages, in which the exact value of the articles shipped is
attempted to be reached.
For this limitation upon the amount of his recovery, the shipper
has a good consideration in the reduction of the charges for the
carriage of his goods. That these charges are based on the risk
assumed by the carrier, is plainly brought out by Lord Mansfield in
Of
the early case of Gibbon v. P'avnton, 4 Burr. 2298 (1769).
course, if the shipper could show that there was not this due proportion between the extent of the carrier's liability and the freight
charges, then the contract would be set aside and he would be
,JfcFadallowed to recover for the entire value of the article lost:
den v. Aa. Pac. R. R. Co., 92 Mo. 343 (1887).
There are many cases which hold that such contracts are not
valid, and of them R. .R. Co. v. 1T'in, 88 Tenn. 320 (1889) is,
perhaps, typical. There the court considered that the contract was
an exemption by the carrier from his liability for negligence, which
is expressly denied to him in numerous cases, of which R. R. Co.
v. Lockwood, I7 Wall. 357 (1873) is the best known. The Tennessee court then tries to draw a distinction between the case at
bar, and Hartv. R. .R. Co., and kindred cases, by saying that in
them there was an agreed valtation, which was properly held to
estop the shipper from claiming a greater sum.
The language of the contract in 2. 2. Co. v. Wf'nn, was:
-The amount claimed shall not exceed," etc. It is worthy of
note that in the case of R. R. Co. v. Henlei, 52 Ala. 6o6
(1875), one of the cases in which the limitation was upheld, and
approved of in Hiartv. 2. R2. Co., precisely the same contract was
before the court, the railroad company which gave the bill of lading
being the same in both cases.
But if the so-called "agreed valuation " in Hart v. R. R. Co.,

NOTES.

was nothing more nor less than a limitation of liability, then this
attempted distinction falls to the ground. As to the question of
limitation or exemption in cases of negligence, it is clear that no
want of care is induced, as the carrier is liable up to the limit set;
and if the loss arise from negligence, the restriction put upon the
amount of the shipper's recovery will only be upheld if it be fairly
based on the freight charges. This view is clearly stated in the
opinion in Hartv. R. R. Co.
The reason that so many of the courts refuse to enforce contracts
to limit the recovery of the shipper, is that they cling to the old
Common Law rule. They are perfectly correct in saying that the
carrier cannot of hinself defeat the liability imposed upon him by
law, because he exercises a public calling and the shipper can
always insist upon his Common Law rights. But when the shipper
chooses, in consideration of reduced rates, to waive those rights, in
whole or in part, there would seem to be no reason why he should
not be estopped from claiming more than the stipulated value,
which he has himself agreed shall be the limit of the carrier's
liability for the purposes of that transaction.
This thought is expressed in R. R. Co. v. Hale, 6 Mich. 242
(1859): "We unhesitatingly say that the company cannot restrict
their Common Law liability as carriers in any way.

.

.

. Whether

they can enter into a contract with an individual desiring to
employ them, by which such individual relinquishes some of the
rights which the law, in the absence of a contract, gives to him, is
quite another question, and involves the power of all who seek to
employ them, to contract respecting such employment. It is the
unfortunate form in which this question has been presented that has
surrounded it with difficulties, or suggested any doubts. The idea
prominently conveyed by the question is, that of the e.xrpare action
of the company, and this arises from the form of the question-can
the company "restrict" or "limit," etc.-which suggests that of
individual action. But when a contract is made, there are at least
two parties acting, and to hold that the liability of the company
is inflexibly and unalterably fixed by law, denies to parties employing them the right of making any contract with them, upon any
consideration by which the liability of the company may be
lessened. . . .. Now, the contract of an individual with the company, made to subserve his interest, is not a restriction by the
company of their Common Law liability, even though a diminution
of such liability results therefrom," etc.
This would seem to be the correct view of the question, for it is
difficult to understand, if public policy is to favor the freedom of
contract, why such coutracts should not be upheld by the courts,
iiiteal of being condemned as contrary to )ublic policy. As
such limitations seem to be in direct accord with the requirements
of mo,lern business, and as they have been approved in several
well-considered cases, it seems a safe prediction that they will soon
be recognized by all the courts, and, when reasonable in their
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terms, will be sustained against shippers who claim an amount
greater than that agreed upon.
The true test, then, in every case, must be whether the due proportion between the limit of the carrier's liability and his compensation for carriage, has been maintained, rather than whether the
contract contains an "agreed valuation," or an "exemption from
liability for negligence.'
CONCLUSIVENESS OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS.
The important subject of the effect of a foreign judgment in eersonain when sued upon
in our courts, which had remained without an authoritative determination from the time of the institution of our government, has
lately received careful consideration by the Supreme Court of the
United States in the case of Hilton v. Gut'ot, 159 U. S. 113. The
case marks an epoch in our legal history, inasmuch as in it a divergence is made in our law from the well-established English rule
upon this same question. After much vacillation, the English
courts have decided that, with the one exception of fraud practised
by the plaintiff in procuring it, such a judgment, by a court of competent jurisdiction and upon regular proceedings, shall be conclusive
upon the merits of the case. This rule is based upon the principle
that the adjudication by the foreign court creates a legal obligation
which the defendant is bound to satisfy. By the decision in Hilton
v. Guyot, the English rule and its principle are declared to be no
part of our law. Justice Gray makes a profound review of the
English and American cases, and an elaborate examination of the
existing laws and usages among civilized nations, and arrives at the
conclusion that our comity extends the effect of primafacie evidence
to foreign judgments, and that it is sufficient ground to impeach
the conclusiveness of the judgment that the courts of the country
from which it comes do not grant reciprocal effect to judgments of
our courts. Therefore the fact that by the law of France, from
which country the judgment in this case was brought, no reciprocity
is extended to judgments of foreign courts, was held sufficient
reason to examine anew the merits of the case.
It is the adoption of the principle of reciprocity as a part of our
law that forms the striking feature of the case, and gave rise to dissent upon the part of four members of the court and to adverse
criticism in some legal periodicals. This part of the decision was
reached upon the precedent of the laws and usages of a preponderating number of civilized nations, and upon the broad ground that
intemational law is founded upon the principles of mutuality and
reciprocity. The adoption of reciprocity as the determinative
factor in the treatment of foreign judgments seems but a consistent
following of the conception that permeates all other dealings among
the nations, which have become general enough to be termed international. Wherever a custom has arisen to the dignity of public
international law, it has been upon the basis of reciprocal rights
and obligations; so also where treaties are made for the regulation

